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Abstract: This paper bridges two recent studies on the role of analysts to provide 
new and relevant information to investors. On the one hand, the 
contribution of analysts to long-term price discovery on the US market is 
rather low. Considering earnings per share forecasts as the main output 
of analysts’ reports, their information share amounts to only 4.6% on 
average. On the other hand, trading strategies set up on these EPS 
forecasts are quite profitable. Self-financing portfolios yield excess returns 
of more than 5% p.a. over the S&P 100 index for a time period of 36 years, 
which is persistent after controlling for the well-known risk factors. In this 
paper, we discuss the link between the low information shares and the 
high abnormal returns. We argue that information shares of analysts 
cannot be higher, because otherwise their forecasts would lead to 
excessively profitable trading strategies which are very unlikely to persist 
over such a long period of time.  
 
Keywords:  analysts, informational leadership, information shares, self-financing 
trading strategies. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The importance of financial analysts working on the sell-side of the market, providing 
stock forecasts to a broad audience of market participants, remains controversial. As 
information intermediaries, their central functions are the identification, analysis, and 
aggregation of information which is new to investors and the effective communication 
of this information as a diversity of forecasts such as target prices, buy-sell-hold-
recommendations, etc. With their knowledge of macroeconomic developments, 
markets, industry sectors and companies, financial analysts are expected to be in 
informational leadership relative to other stock market participants when it comes to 
assessing a firm’s future development and its firm value. However, according to the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) of Fama (1970), the market itself is already efficient in 
processing new information. If the EMH holds, all relevant information is always fully 
reflected by stock prices and there is no economic legitimation for information 
intermediaries like financial analysts. 
In this paper, we analyze the actual degree of informational leadership of sell-side 
financial analysts in developed stock markets and discuss the degree to which 
individual investors can profit from analysts’ leadership. We first analyze the results of 
Baule and Wilke (2016), who employ a direct measure of analyst’s informational 
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leadership relative to other stock market participants and quantify the empirical 
information share of analysts’ consensus forecasts of a company’s earnings per share 
(EPS) in the price discovery process of US S&P 100 index members. These empirical 
information shares turn out to be very low and vary strongly in the cross-section. In fact, 
analysts seem to obtain informational advantages only for a relatively small number of 
companies. Based on these findings, we turn to the exploitability of potential 
informational advantages of analysts. We show that trading strategies based on a 
forecast-related mispricing measure, which is provided in Baule and Wilke (2015), yield 
exceptionally high risk-adjusted returns and are therefore highly profitable. Thus, 
although financial analysts have only very limited influence on the price discovery 
processes in highly developed markets, this small contribution to informational 
efficiency translates into potentially high abnormal returns when exploited by an 
appropriate trading strategy.   
 
2. Analysts’ Contribution to Long-Term Price Discovery 
 
2.1 Informational Leadership in the Context of Financial Analysts and Stock 
Market Investors  
Informational leadership in the context of financial analysts and stock market investors 
describes the ability of analysts to process new information faster than the investors and 
vice versa. Here, processing new information involves (i) identifying new information 
and (ii) interpreting new information. Certain parts of information are completely 
processed by analysts or investors at the moment they are reflected in analyst forecasts 
or stock prices. Wilke (2016) distinguishes between situations in which a party (analysts, 
investors) processes (i) at least a single information component faster (partial 
informational leadership), (ii) more than the half of relevant information faster (relative 
informational leadership) and finally (iii) all information available faster than the 
respective other party (absolute informational leadership).1  
 
As stock prices and analyst forecasts are subject to noise and other non-informational 
movements, informational leadership analysis should not involve all changes in a 
company’s stock or an analyst’s forecast. In fact, it must separate information-driven 
permanent changes from transitory and information-free movements, which might be 
due e. g. to bid-ask bounces or individual investors’ demand for liquidity. Stock prices 
and EPS forecasts tend to be non-stationary, which means that their distribution 
changes over time – this enables them to grow over all bounds. Non-stationary variables 
can be decomposed into a non-stationary component described by a stochastic trend 
and a stationary component. Information-driven movements are associated with the 
development of the non-stationary stochastic trend component, while information-free 
movements are connected to the stationary component, which does not influence the 
stock price or the EPS forecast in the long-run. 
 
2.2 Information Shares – A Direct Measure of Analysts’ Informational Leadership 
Information shares as suggested by Hasbrouck (1995) provide a relative measure of 
informational leadership and are based on the concept of co-integration. Although 
                                                     
1 See Wilke (2016), p. 73-75 
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non-stationary financial variables like stock prices or EPS forecasts might grow over all 
bounds, they tend to move together over time if they are co-integrated. Non-stationary 
variables are typically co-integrated, if they are driven by the same underlying 
fundamentals. Obviously, both stock prices and EPS forecasts related to a firm are 
driven by that firm’s fundamental development and are therefore expected to be co-
integrated. Co-integration can be illustrated for (scaled) EPS forecasts and stock prices 
of Walt Disney (see Figure 1). 
 
  
 
Figure 1: Co-movement of stock prices and (scaled) EPS forecasts for Walt 
Disney over time. 
 
As Figure 1 shows, stock prices and (scaled) EPS forecasts develop stochastically over 
time. However, both series are fundamentally related, since both of them correspond 
to the fundamental value of the underlying company. This ties the development of 
prices and (scaled) forecasts together and makes them stay on a common long-term 
path. The common long-term path is characterized by the common stochastic trend 
shared by both time series. Information shares quantify the degree to which both prices 
and forecasts contribute to this common stochastic trend, and therefore to the 
common long-term development. The more EPS forecasts drive the common long-term 
development, the bigger is the information share of the analysts and – conversely – the 
lower the information share of the market participants. 
 
2.3 Empirical Information Shares of Financial Analysts  
Baule and Wilke (2016) compute empirical information shares for a highly liquid segment 
of the US American stock market. They analyze 75 constituents of the S&P 100 Index. The 
dataset is based on monthly data and spans 36 years, including monthly analyst 
consensus EPS forecasts and stock prices from January 1976 through March 2012. The 
analyst consensus forecasts are rolling twelve-month-ahead estimates. This means that 
every month’s EPS forecast estimates the development of the respective company’s 
earnings per share over the following one-year horizon. Market data are obtained from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream, forecast data are taken from the Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S 
database.  
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Table 1: Empirical information shares of financial analysts for S&P-100 Index members. 
Information shares significantly larger than zero are indicated by ° (10% level), * (5% 
level), ** (1% level) and *** (0.1% level), based on bootstrapping methods. 
Name ISAnalysts (%) 
 
Name 
 
ISAnalysts (%) 
 
3M 1.1  IBM 3.3 
Alcoa 0.7  Intel 0.3 
Altria Group 33.3*  Johnson & Johnson 0.1 
American Electric Power 0.2  JP Morgan Chase & Co. 10.1° 
American Express 0.0  Kraft Foods 6.5 
Apache 0.0  Lockheed Martin 0.0 
AT&T 0.2  Lowe’s 2.5 
Avon Products 0.7  McDonald’s 1.6 
Baker Hughes 2.4  Medtronic 0.0 
Bank of America 0.0  Merck & Co. 0.0 
Bank of New York 0.0  Monsanto 1.2 
Baxter International 0.0  Morgan Stanley 4.3 
Boeing 0.4  National Oilwell Varco 1.3 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 0.0  Nike 5.1 
Caterpillar 1.5  Norfolk Southern Railway 27.5* 
Chevron Corporation 2.3  Occidental Petroleum 0.0 
Citigroup 23.6  Oracle 0.0 
Coca-Coal Company 0.0  PepsiCo 6.2 
Colgate-Palmolive 0.0  Pfizer 0.0 
ConocoPhillips 2.1  Procter & Gamble 0.0 
CVS Caremark 2.6  Qualcomm 0.0 
Dell 0.0  Raytheon 21.8* 
Devon Energy 0.0  Schlumberger 0.8 
Dow Chemicals 0.0  Southern Company 0.4 
Emerson 5.0  Sprint Nextel 22.3* 
Entergy 5.4  Target Corporation 7.5* 
Exelon 7.3  Texas Instruments 0.0 
Exxon Mobil 0.0  Union Pacific 15.2* 
FedEx 12.9°  United Technologies Corp. 15.7* 
Freeport-McMoRan 0.0  UnitedHealth 0.1 
General Dynamics 13.4*  US Bancorp 0.0 
General Electric 0.0  Verizon Communications 0.2 
Gilead Sciences 8.8  Walt Disney 9.5° 
Halliburton 0.0  Wells Fargo 15.7* 
Heinz Company 0.0  Weyerhaeuser 29.1** 
Hewlett-Packard 3.4  Williams Companies 0.0 
Home Depot 0.0  Xerox 0.0 
Honeywell International 6.9 
 
   
Mean 4.6***  Min 0.0 
SD (Mean) 7.7  1Q 0.0 
SE (Mean) 0.9  Median 0.7 
   3Q 6.2 
   Max 33.3 
Companies 75    
Significance at 10% level 13    
Significance at 5% level 9    
Significance at 1% level 1    
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Table 1 shows the empirical information shares of financial analysts at the firm level. 
Obviously, most information is processed faster by the market itself than by financial 
analysts. Market prices reflect more than 95% of relevant information before they get 
incorporated into analyst consensus EPS forecasts. For the majority of the analyzed 
sample firms, investors are in absolute informational leadership compared to financial 
analysts. On average, the informational advantage of analysts is rather marginal; their 
share in price discovery is only 4.6%. Moreover, the analyst share varies considerably in 
the cross-section: For the broad majority of the examined firms, analysts possess no 
significant informational advantage at all. For single companies like Altria Group (33.3%), 
Norfolk Southern Railway (27.5%), Sprint Nexel (22.3%) or Weyerhaeuser (29.1%) however, 
analyst forecasts reflect a measurable and significant share of relevant information first. 
Only 13 out of 75 sample companies yield significant information shares for the analyst 
side. For these firms, analysts are in partial informational leadership and participate 
measurably in the price discovery process. Overall however, analysts appear to be pure 
information followers most of the time, contributing only to the price discovery process of 
a rather small number of firms. 
 
3. Exploitability of Analysts’ Informational Leadership  
 
3.1 Informational Leadership in the Context of Financial Analysts and Stock 
Market Investors 
 
As shown in the previous section, empirical information shares, which provide a direct 
measure of analysts’ informational leadership, are exceptionally low in highly 
developed market segments such as the S&P 100 index constituents. However, as 
analysts do significantly participate in the price discovery processes of single firms, we 
now turn to an investment and portfolio management perspective and analyze 
whether a stock market investor is able to exploit the small but existent informational 
advantages of analysts. Baule and Wilke (2015) construct a measure of a stock’s 
temporary misevaluation, termed Q. This measure focuses on information-driven EPS 
forecast revisions of financial analysts, relative to the corresponding actual stock returns 
observed in the market. The aim of Q is to identify stocks which analysts implicitly 
consider as under- or overvalued – based on their forecast revision and the 
corresponding actual stock return. An upward revision of a company’s EPS forecast can 
be interpreted as a signal that financial analysts expect the fundamental value of the 
company to be higher now than before. If the market directly reflects analysts’ forecast 
revisions, a positive forecast revision should be associated with a positive actual stock 
return for the observed period of time.  
 
Based on these ideas, Q is defined as the ratio of the gross EPS forecast revision and the 
corresponding gross stock return:  
 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 = 1+𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴1+𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 (1) 
with 
 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸�𝑡𝑡−𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸�𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸�𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘  (2) 
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and 
 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘  (3) 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸� 𝑡𝑡 is the consensus EPS forecast of analysts in time t, and 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 the corresponding stock 
price. The parameter k defines the length of the formation period in months, over which 
the observed stock returns and forecast revisions of analysts are compared. For this study, 
k is fixed at 6 months. 
 
3.2 Implementation of Q-based Trading Strategies 
 
How effective is the Q measure in identifying over- and undervalued stocks in the US 
stock market top segment, and do Q-based trading strategies outperform the market? 
Which Q-based returns correspond to the very low empirical information shares 
measured between 1976 and 2012? In this section, we will analyze the efficiency of Q 
and the performance of Q-based trading strategies involving the S&P 100 index 
members. 
 
We analyzed the time period from February 1978 to December 2013, during which a 
total of 278 companies were constituents of the S&P 100 index for at least one month. 
The index composition is updated monthly. The main variables include monthly stock 
returns and the corresponding monthly EPS consensus forecast revisions of the analysts. 
Since sample firms might pay dividends, and since during the sample period capital 
increases or stock splits might occur, we use adjusted stock prices. Overall the sample 
data are basically the same as that used to compute the empirical information shares. 
Again, all company related data is provided by Thomson Reuters. For the calculation 
of risk-adjusted returns, monthly risk-free rates and monthly empirical risk factors 
suggested by Fama and French (1993), Fama and French (2015), and Carhart (1997) 
are employed, which are freely available in the Kenneth R. French Data Library.2  
 
Since the index composition is adjusted on a monthly basis, the tradable stock universe 
contains only the actual S&P-100 index members on every trade date. Every month, Q 
is computed for all eligible stocks to determine their actual degree of misvaluation, 
before the stock universe is ordered by Q in decreasing order. Therefore, the first 
positions within the ordered stock universe are always occupied by stocks which 
analysts implicitly consider to be undervalued, while the last positions contain stocks 
which analysts see as overvalued. A quintile approach is then used to divide the stock 
universe into five equally weighted portfolios. In decreasing order, these quintile 
portfolios are then categorized as a High20 portfolio (positions 1 to 20), MidHigh20 
portfolio (21 to 40), Mid20 portfolio (41 to 60), MidLow20 portfolio (61 to 80) or Low20 
portfolio (81 to 100). The holding period for all quintile portfolios is the 1-month window 
between two consecutive EPS consensus forecasts. Based on the five quintile portfolios, 
we implement two self-financing trading strategies which (i) buy the High20 portfolio 
while short-selling the Low20 portfolio (High20 – Low20 strategy), or (ii) buy both the 
High20 and the MidHigh20 portfolio while short-selling the MidLow20 and the Low20 
portfolio (High40 – Low40 strategy). After every portfolio rebalancing, monthly quintile 
portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate and the returns of the two self-financing 
                                                     
2 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data\_library.html 
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strategies are computed. The excess returns are calculated over the exact period 
between the day of the current portfolio reformation and the day of the consecutive 
portfolio revision. 
 
3.3 Results and Discussion of the Q-based Strategies 
 
Figure 2 shows cumulated excess returns for the High20 portfolio (black line) and the 
Low20 portfolio (grey line). Also included as a benchmark are the cumulated excess 
returns of the market (dotted line), i.e. the excess returns of the S&P-100 Index. The 
High20 portfolio clearly outperforms the market, while the Low20 portfolio 
underperforms. 
 
  
 
Figure 2: Performance of the Q-based extreme portfolios and the market. 
 
 
Table 2 gives an overview over the performance of the quintile portfolios and the two 
self-financing strategies. Also included is the excess return of the market as a 
benchmark. Reported are monthly excess returns over the risk-free rate. 
 
Table 2: Monthly excess returns of the Q-based quintile portfolios, the Q-based 
self-financing strategies and the market. 
Portfolio Mean excess return (%) Std. Err. (%) 
High20 0.886 ** 0.317 
MidHigh20 0.612 * 0.252 
Mid20 0.571 ** 0.218 
MidLow20 0.494 * 0.221 
Low20 0.439 ° 0.263 
S&P-100 Index (Market) 0.598 * 0.237 
High20 – Low20 0.446 * 0.214 
High40 – Low40 0.282 ° 0.149 
° p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The High20 portfolio yields monthly excess returns of 0.89%, the Low20 portfolio only 
0.44%. Moreover, the mean excess returns decrease monotonically between both 
extreme portfolios. Obviously, Q is capable of identifying over- and undervalued stocks 
effectively. As a consequence, both self-financing strategies generate significantly 
positive returns: Buying the 20 (40) most undervalued stocks while short-selling the 20 (40) 
most overvalued stocks yields monthly returns of 0.45% (0.28%). 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the development of the High20 – Low20 strategy returns within the 
analyzed period. Reported are both cumulated (black line, left axis) and not 
cumulated (grey bars, right axis) monthly strategy returns. 
 
  
 
Figure 3: Performance of the Q-based extreme portfolios and the market. 
 
Figure 3 shows that the Q-based strategy of buying undervalued stocks while short-
selling overvalued stocks yielded positive monthly returns most of the time. However, 
analysts did not foresee the dotcom bubble, which was building up around the turn of 
millennium. Their informational advantage decreased significantly in the years between 
1998 and 2002 and even turned into a relative informational disadvantage, which is 
reflected in the preponderantly negative returns throughout this period. In contrast, 
analysts were able to increase their informational edge in the turbulent first decade of 
the new millennium. Especially, they did not seem to lose their advantage in the course 
of the 2007 financial crisis. Indeed, the High20 – Low20 strategy generated an ongoing 
series of extremely high monthly returns in the recovery period around 2009. Overall, 
analysts seem to have withstood the decade’s turbulences better than the market. 
 
3.4 Q-based Strategy Performance after Adjusting for Risk 
 
The foregoing analysis concentrated on monthly returns in excess of the risk-free rate, 
which did not take into account that stocks differ in their risk-return characteristics. The 
observed high returns of the High20 portfolio might therefore simply be due to an 
increase in the riskiness of the portfolio investment. After all, are the discussed Q-based 
strategies systematically picking high-risk stocks to boost their performance? In the 
following, we therefore focus on risk-adjusted returns. We employ an empirical 
expansion of the CAPM which includes all well-established risk factors: the market factor 
(MKT), the two traditional Fama and French (1993) factors of firm size “small minus big” 
(SMB) and book-to-market ratio “high minus low” (HML), the Carhart (1997) momentum 
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factor (MOM), and the two new Fama and French (2015) factors of profitability “robust 
minus weak” (RMW) and investment behavior “conservative minus aggressive” (CMA): 
ERt = α + βMKT MKTt + βSMB SMBt + βHML HMLt + βCMA CMAt + βRMW RMWt + βMOM MOMt + εt. 
(4) 
ERt denotes the excess return of the Q-based portfolios over the risk-free rate in month t. 
Table 3 shows the risk-adjusted performance of Q-based portfolios, based on the 6-
factor model. The model fit is quite good, which is indicated by an adjusted R² ranging 
between 80% and 90% for the quintile portfolios. The portfolio alphas decrease 
significantly between both extreme quintile portfolios (High20, Low20). The High20 
portfolio significantly outperforms the 6-factor model by 0.48% per month, while the 
Low20 portfolio gets outperformed by the model and yields a negative alpha of –0.22% 
per month. As a consequence, both self-financing strategies remain profitable even 
after adjusting for risk. The High20 – Low20 strategy generates a monthly alpha of 0.70% 
in excess of the 6-factor model; the High40 – Low40 strategy still outperforms the model 
by 0.49% per month. Notably, the High20 portfolio and the Low20 portfolio do not differ 
in terms of systematic market risk. 
 
Table 3: Risk-adjusted performance of the Q-based quintile portfolios and the Q-
based self-financing strategies. 
n = 431 α βMKT βSMB βHML βCMA βRMW βMOM R² 
High +0.484*** (0.13) 
+1.081*** 
(0.35) 
+0.199*** 
(0.05) 
–0.046 
(0.06) 
–0.181° 
(0.09) 
+0.030 
(0.16) 
–0.274 
(0.04) 0.88 
MidHigh20 +0.035 (0.10) 
+1.017*** 
(0.03) 
–0.088* 
(0.04) 
–0.047 
(0.05) 
–0.038 
(0.06) 
–0.035 
(0.05) 
+0.030 
(0.03) 0.90 
Mid20 –0.052 (0.08) 
+0.907*** 
(0.02) 
–0.072* 
(0.04) 
–0.037 
(0.04) 
+0.104° 
(0.06) 
+0.077° 
(0.04) 
+0.050* 
(0.02) 0.89 
LowMid20 –0.237** (0.09) 
+0.946*** 
(0.02) 
–0.108** 
(0.04) 
+0.039 
(0.05) 
+0.127* 
(0.06) 
+0.107** 
(0.04) 
+0.121*** 
(0.03) 0.88 
Low20 –0.215° (0.13) 
+1.017*** 
(0.04) 
+0.060 
(0.05) 
+0.093 
(0.07) 
–0.022 
(0.08) 
–0.111* 
(0.06) 
+0.094* 
(0.04) 0.82 
High20–
Low20 
+0.699*** 
(0.21) 
+0.064 
(0.07) 
+0.139° 
(0.08) 
–0.139 
(0.12) 
–0.159 
(0.15) 
+0.081 
(0.10) 
–0.368*** 
(0.07) 0.19 
High40–
Low40 
+0.486*** 
(0.15) 
+0.068 
(0.05) 
+0.079 
(0.05) 
–0.112 
(0.06) 
–0.162 
(0.09) 
–0.030 
(0.07) 
–0.230*** 
(0.05) 0.21 
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4. Conclusion: Low Level of Informational Leadership but High Level of 
Exploitability 
 
How do the results of low information shares and high abnormal returns relate to each 
other? In the first part of this paper we found that analysts exercised only marginal 
informational leadership on highly developed stock markets. On average, equity analysts 
tend to be information followers rather than information leaders. However, since analysts 
do possess temporary informational advantages for a small number of firms, they do take 
part in the price discovery process of the overall market. In the second part of the paper, 
we discussed the misvaluation measure Q as a vehicle to identify stocks which analysts 
implicitly consider over- or undervalued. The results show that Q is quite successful in 
determining the current level of a stock’s misvaluation. Putting both results together, 
individual investors could exploit analysts’ informational edges systematically and 
generate highly significant returns on their investment − even though the empirical 
informational leadership of analysts is relatively marginal.  
Are these results implausible? Is the empirical information share of analysts “too small” or 
the corresponding individual profit “too high”? Neither one nor the other. If the 
information shares of analysts were considerably larger, they would be able to make 
much better predictions about stock market movements for mid-term investments, 
meaning we would observe even larger abnormal returns from trading strategies such as 
constructed by the Q measure. Much larger abnormal returns, however, are hardly likely 
to continue over such a long period of time. Thus, it is quite plausible that information 
shares of analysts are quite low, because otherwise obvious trading strategies following 
analysts’ EPS forecasts would lead to implausibly high abnormal returns. 
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